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Gardner: Fletcher on Offences and Defences

FLETCHER ON OFFENCES AND DEFENCES
John Gardner*

I.

FLETCHER'S PUZZLE

Sometimes criminal lawyers use the word "defence" in what Paul Robinson
calls a "casual" sense to designate any part of the defendant's case that, advanced
successfully, would suffice to warrant an acquittal.! In this casual sense,
imaginable defences to a criminal charge include such diverse lines of argument as
alibi, denial of mens rea, denial of causation, autrefois acquit, self-defence, duress,
and diplomatic or executive immunity. Private lawyers also use the word
"defence" in this sense: a defence, for private lawyers, is simply the defendant's
reply to the plaintiff's claim. But in criminal law, unlike private law, there is also a
stricter use of the word "defence." The word in its strict sense designates only
those defences in the casual sense that are compatible with the defendant's
conceding that the offence charged was indeed committed. Alibi and denial of
mens rea or causation do not count as defences in this strict sense, because to offer
these arguments is simply to deny the commission of the offence. On the other
hand, self-defence, duress, autrefois acquit, and immunity from prosecution do
count as defences in the strict sense. To plead self-defence, duress, autrefois
acquit, or immunity from prosecution is to argue like this: "Suppose I did commit
the offence charged-I should still be acquitted."
Using the word "defence" in this strict sense, as I will use it from now on,
yields a neat contrast between offences and defences. Every issue relevant to
criminal liability is relevant either under the heading of "offence" or under the
heading of "defence." Criminal lawyers are prone to thinking that the allocation
of issues as between these two headings is inconsequential, or at most a matter of
classificatory convenience for textbook writers.2 Others think that the allocation
of issues as between the two headings matters procedurally, when we come to
discuss the shifting of probative or evidence-adducing burdens as between
prosecutor and defendant.3 In Rethinking Criminal Law ("Rethinking"),4 George
Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Oxford.
1. Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 199, 203
(1982).
2. See e.g. Glanville Williams, Offences and Defences, 2 Leg. Stud. 233 (1982).
3. See e.g. Michael S. Moore, Act and Crime: The Philosophy of Action and ItsImplications for
Criminal Law 179 (Clarendon Press 1993).
4. George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Little, Brown & Co. 1978).
*
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Fletcher famously, and in my view rightly, rejects both of these views. The
contrast between offences and defences has little to do with the shifting of any
burdens, and nor should it have. On the other hand, the contrast between
offences and defences is far from inconsequential, and its consequences extend not
only to the organisation of textbooks but also to the moral quality of the criminal
law. According to Fletcher,
[t]here are at least four areas of legal dispute where recognizing the distinction could
have concrete consequences. First, it is of critical importance in deciding when
external facts, standing alone, should have an exculpatory effect. Secondly, it might
bear on the analysis of permissible vagueness in legal norms. Thirdly, it might bear
on the allocation of power between the legislature and judiciary in the continuing
development of the criminal law. And fourthly,
it might be of importance in
5
analyzing the exculpatory effect of mistakes.
When he makes these brilliant and original suggestions in Rethinking, with
which I broadly concur, Fletcher is focusing on just one class of defences, namely
justificatory defences. But it seems to me that his suggestions can and should be
extended beyond justifications to take in excuses as well. Indeed, his fourth
suggestion, as I read it, introduces us to the distinctively excusatory role of
reasonable mistakes. Unfortunately, Fletcher and I have different views about
which defences count as excuses and why.6 So while I will have something to say
about excuses later on, to begin with I will follow Fletcher in focusing largely on
justifications. For completeness I should stress that there are various defences
known to the criminal law that are neither justifications nor excuses. There are
what Robinson calls "non-exculpatory" defences (such as autrefois acquit and
diplomatic and executive immunity), which bear on the standing of the court to try
the case.7 And there are some defences (infancy, insanity) that are genuinely
exculpatory but which bear on the capacity and necessity to answer for what one
did, whether by way of justification or excuse. I doubt whether any of Fletcher's
four suggestions applies these two types of defences. But be that as it may: moral
consequences attach to the distinction between offences and defences so long as
moral consequences sometimes attach to it. Among Fletcher's finest triumphs in
Rethinking is the case he makes for thinking that sometimes they do indeed attach
(namely, when the defences in question are justificatory).
What makes this even more of a triumph is that Fletcher manages
convincingly to attach his four moral consequences to the distinction without ever
quite getting to the bottom of the distinction itself. To be sure, he finds many
helpful ways of restating the distinction ("these are cases in which the inculpatory
dimension is overridden by criteria of exculpation," 8 "grounds of justification
represent licenses or permissions to violate the prohibitory norm," 9 etc.), but these

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. at 555.
See infra n. 26 and accompanying text.
Robinson, supra n. 1, at 229-32.
Fletcher, supra n. 4, at 562.
Id. at 563.
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restatements do not yet explain exactly what is being distinguished and how.
What makes the difference between an "offence" issue and a "defence" issue, or
an "inculpation" issue and an "exculpation" issue? What determines which issues
should be allocated to which category? Fletcher understandably resists the idea
that the answer depends on accidents of statutory drafting or judicial whim. He
naturally suspects that a distinction on which so much of moral moment turns
must itself turn on something of moral moment. But what does it turn on? After
much fine-grained deliberation, Fletcher's answer still seems unsatisfying:
The minimal demand on the definition of an offense is that it reflect a morally
coherent norm in a given society at a given time. It is only when the definition
corresponds to a norm of this social force that satisfying the definition inculpates the
actor. There is nothing inculpatory about driving. Nor is anything incriminating or
inculpatory in carrying an object. Adding the element that the object belongs to
another makes the act more incriminating; including the element of the owner's
nonconsent brings us closer to a prima facie case of wrongdoing.

This discussion.., illustrates the general methodology for distinguishing
between the prohibitory norm and the countervailing criteria of privilege. The norm
10
must contain a sufficient number of elements to state a coherent moral imperative.
The reference to the mores of a "given society at a given time" must surely
be left on one side as a distraction. Social mores may bear on where the line ends
up being drawn in a particular legal system, but the question remains: what line is
it that social mores, and hence legal systems, are trying to draw? In what way is an
inculpation issue really different from an exculpation issue, in social or legal life?
In this passage, and throughout his discussion, Fletcher seems to get stuck at this
answer: We have to ask when we have arrived at sufficient inculpation, and then
the rest will be exculpation. But this helps little when our original question was:
what does the distinction between inculpation and exculpation-also known as
the distinction between offence and defence-turn on?
II.

RATIONAL CONFLICTS AND REMAINDERS

In an important but too-rarely-cited article, Kenneth Campbell argues that
the distinction between offences and (justificatory) defences is ultimately based on
the distinction between reasons against doing something and reasons in favour."
When someone pleads a justification, she is claiming that the reasons in favour of
doing as she did stand undefeated by the reasons against. The reasons against are
those that make what she did an offence. They have not gone away. They still
make it an offence. But the reasons in favour prevail and make it a justified
offence (and hence one of which she should be acquitted).

10. Id. at 567-68.
11. See Kenneth Campbell, Offence and Defence, in Criminal Law and Justice: Essays from the
W.G. Hart Workshop, 1986, at 73 (I.H. Dennis ed., Sweet & Maxwell 1987).
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Think about this example, adapted from Campbell's discussion. Consent is
sometimes a defence in the criminal law. The offence of assault occasioning actual
bodily harm, for example, is committed even when there is consent. Consent
merely serves to justify its commission. But sometimes-for example, in the law
of rape-absence of consent is instead an element of the offence. The offence of
rape is not committed, and hence does not need to be justified, if the sexual
intercourse is consented to. Why the difference? Because, says Campbell, there is
no general reason not to have sexual intercourse, whereas there is a general
reason not to occasion actual bodily harm. Actual bodily harm is per se an
unwelcome turn of events, even when consensual; sexual intercourse is not per se
an unwelcome turn of events, but becomes one by virtue of being non-consensual.
This contrast is captured in the law's treatment of consent under the "defence"
heading in assault occasioning actual bodily harm, but under the "offence"
heading in rape.
Of course, it is possible for people to disagree about whether there is a
general reason not to have sexual intercourse or a general reason not to occasion
actual bodily harm. That is not denied. Campbell's only point is that if one has
such a disagreement, one is apt also to disagree about whether the issue of consent
should be handled under the "offence" or the "defence" heading. Those who
think that, in the law of rape, sexual intercourse tout court should be regarded as
the real offence and consent as a defence had best be able to identify a general
reason not to have sexual intercourse, such that one needs a defeating reason in
favour before one should engage in it. And likewise those who think that there is
no reason not to occasion actual bodily harm, such that one needs no defeating
reason to occasion it, had better stand up for the view that consent, in cases of
assault occasioning actual bodily harm, belongs not under the "defence" heading
but under the "offence" heading."
Central to Campbell's modest proposal is the idea that cases of justified
offending are not cases of innocuous action: the offence is still committed and is
still, qua offence, unwelcome. Its commission, albeit justified, remains regrettable.
It would have been better still had there been no occasion to commit it, and hence
no need to ask whether its commission was justified or not. This we can call the
"remainders thesis": justified action still leaves a remainder of conflicting reasons
that were, regrettably, not conformed to. As Campbell spells the thesis out:
The reasons may have been overwhelmingly in favour of performing the action, but
as long as the law takes the view that some harm has nevertheless been done it
recognises the continuing existence, even in those circumstances, of a prima facie
reason against. Suppose someone kills a terrorist who is about to detonate a bomb
which will certainly kill dozens of people. His action is certainly permissible, and
probably more than just that. So long, however, as the law takes the view that the
life, even of that terrorist, was something of value then it recognises the existence of
some reason against the action, albeit one which was clearly overridden.

12. Which was indeed the line taken by the minority (Lords Mustill and Slynn) in the famous
British sado-masochism case Brown [1994] AC 212 (HL).
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[But] it can be different in a society with different values. Take the case of
outlawry. Someone who kills an outlaw in those societies which recognise such an
absence of status requires no defence in the sense in which that is opposed to an
offence. His act is simply not within the defining terms of the relevant form of
homicide, since these do not extend to victims who are beyond the protection of the

law. From the legal point of view there was not even prima facie3 reason against this
killing for, from that point of view, this life simply had no value.'
The remainders thesis is captured in Campbell's claim that the law
"recognises the continuing existence," in the terrorist case, of a prima facie reason
against killing. To call the reason "prima facie" is not to claim that it appears to
be there but is exposed as illusory when the terrorist's nefarious plot is exposed.
Rather the reason not to kill the terrorist is really there and continues to be there
and to exert its force throughout, such that killing the terrorist is regrettableeven though this is a case with a stronger conflicting reason such that killing him is
justified.
To see whether Fletcher might help himself to Campbell's modest proposal
as a way of explaining the distinction between offences and defences, we need to
know-does Fletcher endorse the remainders thesis? In Rethinking there is much
to suggest that he does. I already quoted, for example, his reference to justified
offences as "prima facie cases of wrongdoing." Maybe he uses the expression
"prima facie" as Campbell does, to refer to a real and continuing reason that is
regrettably defeated? I also already quoted Fletcher's remark that "grounds of
justification represent licenses or permissions to violate the prohibitory norm." So
the prohibitory norm is violated, and this, one may think, must surely be
regrettable. And yet, continues Fletcher: "A justification is not a conflicting norm
imposing a countervailing duty to act.' 14 Does he mean only that there is no legal
duty to perform justified actions, even to stop Campbell's terrorist? Or does he
mean that there is no conflict to be resolved (and hence no remainder)? To add to
our doubts: He goes on to label cases of justified action as falling under
"exceptions to ... norms," 5 and he talks of justified offences as only "nominally"
violations. 6 Both of these formulations suggest a rejection of the remainders
thesis. They suggest that when one is justified in committing an offence, one has
no more cause for regret than when one commits no offence at all. There is no
real reason against doing as one does. In which case, we must read Fletcher as
rejecting the remainders thesis and hence as having no use for Campbell's modest
proposal.
III.

FROM REASONS TO NoRms

How are we to interpret Fletcher on the subject of remainders? One thing to
notice is that, while Campbell is talking about conflicts of reasons (and rational

13.
14.
15.
16.

Campbell, supra n. 11, at 83 (emphasis omitted).
Fletcher, supra n. 4, at 563-64.
Id. at 565.
Id. at 561.
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remainders), Fletcher is talking about conflicts of norms (and normative
remainders). A norm is not simply a reason. It is a reason with a special structure.
The structure depends on what kind of norm it is. For simplicity's sake, I will
focus on mandatory norms, the norms according to which a certain action is
required or prohibited. In the helpful terminology devised by Joseph Raz,
mandatory norms are "protected reasons.' ' 17 They are reasons to perform the
required act (or not to perform the prohibited act) that also serve as reasons not
to act on some or all of the conflicting reasons. Thus, for example, the norm of
Italian cooking that prohibits the use of metal implements to chop basil (assuming
it is a sound norm) is a reason not to use metal implements to chop basil that is
also a reason not to act for the reason that a metal implement is the one closest to
hand. And the moral norm that prohibits promise-breaking (assuming it is a
sound norm) is a reason not to break promises that is also a reason not to act for
the reason that doing so would be cheap and convenient. The structure of the
reason means that it punches above its weight. Of course, it still has weight as an
ordinary reason for action, but it also has a second dimension of force, which Raz
dubs its "exclusionary"1 8 force. A mandatory norm is a reason that defeats some
conflicting reasons by weight, but defeats others by exclusion. Irrespective of their
weight, the excluded reasons are not to be relied upon as reasons for action (and
in that sense no longer count as reasons).19
When the law requires or prohibits a certain action-for example, by
creating a new criminal offence-it purports to exclude all conflicting reasons.
Legally, upon the creation of a new criminal offence, one has reason not to act on
any reason that militates against conformity with the norm (i.e., that militates in
favour of committing the offence). It should be stressed that the law is perfectly
happy for one to act on any reason at all in favour of conformity with the norm.
One need not do so because of the legal norm. All the law cares about is
conformity, never mind why one conforms. But, by the same token, the law is not
interested in why one didn't conform. Any reason one gives for nonconformity
with the norm falls on deaf ears. At least, this is the position if all the law does is
create a criminal offence. Everything changes, however, if the law offers, in
addition, a justificatory defence. When it does so, the law selectively opens its
ears to some reasons that some defendants may have had for nonconformity with
the law's norms. It allows the fact that one was provoked, or threatened, or
attacked, for example, to count as a legally admissible reason in favour of
nonconformity with the norm. In short, when the law grants a justificatory
defence it unexcludes some otherwise excluded reasons and allows them once
again to punch their weight in an ordinary rational conflict with the law's ordinary
(now unprotected) reasons for not offending. At this point, everything depends
on the comparative weight of the reasons.

17. Joseph Raz, PracticalReason and Norms 191 (Oxford U. Press 1999).
18. Id.
19. Of course, exclusionary reasons may themselves sometimes be defeated in what Raz calls
"second-order" conflicts. Id. at 47.
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Elsewhere I have tried to capture this complex structure by describing
justificatory defences in the criminal law as "cancelling permissions. 2 ° Some
permissions (sometimes known as "strong permissions") are norms in their own
right. 2' But a cancelling permission is not. When the law grants a cancelling
permission by creating a justification defence it does not set up a second
(permissive) norm that conflicts with the (mandatory) norm created by the law's
specification of the offence. Rather, it creates a gap in the mandatory force of the
mandatory norm, a gap through which certain conflicting reasons are readmitted
as legally acceptable reasons for acting. Across a certain range of cases the
mandatory force of the norm is cancelled. And yet it would be misleading to say
that the norm itself is cancelled. For it still exerts its ordinary rational pull as a
reason not to commit the offence. All it loses is its secondary protective layer. In
this sense, the case of a justification defence in criminal law falls somewhere
between the case of an ordinary justification and an exception to the norm. It is
like an ordinary justification in that there is still a rational conflict exactly as
Campbell describes, with a rational remainder. There is still something to regret
in the fact that one commits the offence; the violation is not just nominal. On the
other hand, a justification defence in criminal law is like an exception to the norm
in that the mandatory force of the norm is, strictly speaking, in abeyance where
the defence applies. So there is a normative remainder in one sense, and not in
another. The law does not simply cancel the norm (create an exception to it). But
the law does cancel (create an exception to) the mandatory part of the norm's
normative force.
Here we have a possible explanation for Fletcher's apparent equivocations
about the remainders thesis. Fletcher is half-right to call justification defences
"exceptions," but also half-right to think that actions falling under them '''violate
the prohibitory norm." The truth, as we have seen, is somewhere between the
two. And Fletcher is certainly right to think that "[a] justification is not a
conflicting norm imposing a countervailing duty to act." Not only is there no
countervailing duty to act, there is no conflicting norm full stop. A justification
defence is conferred not by another norm but by the carving out (from the original
norm that creates the offence) of permissive space for people to act on certain
conflicting reasons. So while there is no conflict of norms, there is a conflict of
reasons. If Fletcher agrees, then he can after all help himself to Campbell's
modest proposal for the explanation of the offence/defence contrast: if there is no
conflict of reasons, and hence no rational remainder, then what we are looking at
is not a defence but a denial of the offence.
In sketching the "cancelling permissions" view of justificatory defences, I
tried to bring out not only how it harmonizes with Campbell's proposal, but also
what it has to recommend itself to Fletcher. Recall Fletcher's first suggested

20. John Gardner, Justificationsand Reasons, in Harm and Culpability 103, 117 (A.P. Simester &
A.T.H. Smith eds., Clarendon Press 1996).
21. See e.g. Georg Henrik von Wright, Norm and Action: A Logical Enquiry 85-89 (Routledge &
Kegan Paul 1963).
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consequence of the offence/defence contrast: "it is of critical importance in
deciding when external facts, standing alone, should have an exculpatory effect."
What Fletcher means is that the state of the world alone, quite apart from the
defendant's responsiveness to it, can suffice to negate an offence. But a
justificatory defence is available only where the defendant is responsive to the
state of the world. 2 The "cancelling permissions" view of justificatory defences
explains why this should be so. As I mentioned, when it comes to the legal norm
that creates an offence, all the law cares about is conformity, never mind why one
conforms. It is no skin off the law's nose whether one acts for legal, moral, or
prudential reasons, or indeed no reasons at all, so long as one does not break the
law. But when it comes to the conferring of a justificatory defence, things are
different. What the conferring of the defence does is unexclude certain conflicting
reasons for action, such that these reasons (unlike others) are now available to be
relied upon as reasons in favour of violating the norm. To avail oneself of the
defence, one relies upon the reasons. It is no good merely to act in the way that
someone relying upon the reason would act. Excluding a reason makes it a
defeated reason, i.e., a reason for which one should not act. Unexcluding it
merely reverses the process. It changes what one should do, on balance, only by
changing what reasons one has available to act on. If one does not act on them,
then one has no justification. 23
IV.

WRONGS AND FAULTS

Fletcher offers one further reflection on the possible import of the
offence/defence contrast, which I have not yet mentioned:
[L]et us think of inculpatory conduct as the violation of a prohibitory norm. For
examples we need only think of the basic commandments of Western society. Thou
shalt not kill, thou shalt not steal - these are the basic prohibitions on which there is
consensus even in morally relativistic, post-religious societies. Yet these simple
imperatives that we invoke in blaming others point merely to paradigmatic instances
of wrongdoing. In order to make out a complete case of responsible wrongdoing,
whether in law or in moral discourse, the simple imperatives must be supplemented
in exceptional cases. The supplementary criteria are grounds of justification and
24
excuse.

There is more than one way to interpret this passage. On the interpretation
I will favour and discuss, Fletcher is saying that prima facie wrongs are by default
"strict" wrongs, i.e., they do not include a requirement of fault. It is only when we
come to assess justifications and excuses that we are assessing fault. In suggesting
this interpretation, I don't mean to attribute to Fletcher the view that prima facie
wrongs are by default wrongs without mens rea. Clearly that is not his view. One
of Fletcher's examples ("thou shalt not kill") is of a prohibitory norm that can be

22.
App.
23.
24.

To see the difference at work in English law, compare Regina v. Dadson,4 Cox C.C. 358 (Crim.
1850), with Regina v. Deller, 36 Crim. App. R. 184 (1952).
I have explored the point in much greater detail in Gardner, supra n. 20.
Fletcher, supra n. 4, at 562.
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violated entirely accidentally, but the other ("thou shalt not steal") is of a
prohibitory norm that can only be violated intentionally (i.e., with mens rea).
That, however, is irrelevant to the interpretation of Fletcher's passage that I am
advancing. The point I am emphasising is that either of these prohibitory norms
can be violated without fault on the part of the violator. That is because neither
norm makes space, as it stands, for any assessment of the violator's reasons for
doing as she does. And that, Fletcher may be interpreted as saying, is where
justifications and excuses come into play: they invite us to assess the violator's
reasons for violating the norm, to see whether she is at fault.
If this is Fletcher's view, I agree with it completely. I have argued at length
elsewhere that the ordinary or basic kind of wrongdoing is "strict" wrongdoing,
e.g., hurting people, upsetting people (for whatever reason). I have also argued
that excuses, like justifications, are defences to wrongdoing that call for an
assessment of the wrongdoer's reasons.26 And I also believe, although I have
never argued, that someone is at fault in committing a wrong if and only if he
commits it without justification or excuse. But all of this adds up to yield a puzzle,
which is also a puzzle for Fletcher as I have just interpreted him.
Fletcher has it that only "paradigmatic" wrongs are captured in such "simple
imperatives" as "thou shalt not kill." I say similarly that such simple wrongs are
just the "ordinary" or "basic" type of wrongs. On both views, however, there can
be more complex and less ordinary wrongs that are partly constituted by the fault
of the wrongdoer. Classic examples in the law include wrongs partly constituted
by the recklessness or negligence of the wrongdoer. These can be called "faultanticipating" wrongs. The fault of the wrongdoer-that she lacks (certain)
justifications and excuses-is a necessary condition of her violating the
prohibitory norm. At least some justifications and excuses are anticipated in the
prohibitory norm. But how can this be? For surely the whole point about
justifications and excuses, the point that Fletcher emphasises time and again and I
have endorsed from the outset of this discussion, is that justifications and excuses
are defences in the strict sense. To offer one is not to deny that one violated the
norm. It is to say: "I may have committed the wrong but...." With faultanticipating wrongs, however, this logic seems to be defied. Where these wrongs
are concerned, a justification or excuse seems also to be a denial of the wrong; a
defence seems also to be denial of the offence. How is this possible? How can
there possibly be any fault-anticipating wrongs?
To answer this question, it is not enough to draw attention to the
complications that I added to Campbell's story in Part III above. True, mandatory
norms often take the shape they do in order to reflect not only the reasons in
favour of doing what they make mandatory, but also at least some of the reasons
25. See John Gardner, Obligations and Outcomes in the Law of Torts, in Relating to Responsibility:
Essays for Tony Honorg on His Eightieth Birthday 111 (Peter Cane & John Gardner eds., Hart Publg.
2001).
26. See John Gardner, The Gist of Excuses, 1 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 575 (1998). This is where Fletcher
and I disagree about excuses. My explanation of excuses excludes insanity whereas his (hesitantly)
includes it. See Fletcher, supra n. 4, at 835-46.
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against. That is the most obvious explanation of why some or all of the reasons
against doing what the norm makes mandatory are excluded from consideration
by the norm. They have already been taken into account and given their full
weight in the original specification of the norm, and to let them in again as
defences would mean counting them twice. Sometimes, of course, they are given
their full weight in the specification of the norm without showing up in the norm's
final shape (e.g., because they were not weighty enough). On other occasions they
show up in the norm's final shape as simple exceptions. At common law, for
example, murder can be committed only under "the Queen's peace." Those who
kill enemy combatants in wartime need not argue that they did so for the defence
of the realm (or for other lawful reasons) because the offence of murder does not
extend to their actions in the first place. Their argument has already been
anticipated in the shape of the prohibitory norm, by way of ordinary exception.
There being no violation, no defence is needed. There is no logical puzzle about
this.
Fault-anticipating wrongs are different. They are logically puzzling. This is
because they do not merely obviate the need for a defence, or otherwise take
account of its force, in the shape they give to the offence. Rather they make the
commission of the offence depend on whether the defendant actually has, or lacks,
the relevant defence. To deny having committed the offence, one must assert the
acceptability of one's reasons for having done as one did, either by justifying it or
excusing it. The logical puzzle can be brought out more vividly, perhaps, by
putting it in the following terms. If the prohibitory norm has not been violated,
what is there to justify or excuse? But if there is nothing to justify or excuse, how
can the absence of a justification or excuse bear on whether the norm has been
violated?
The correct way to dissolve the puzzle is to recognise that these faultanticipating wrongs are in a way parasitic or secondary wrongs. One commits
them only if one lacks a justification or excuse for something else one does as part
and parcel of committing them. In some cases the "something else" is not the
violation of a mandatory norm at all, but merely the failure to conform to an
ordinary reason. One has a weighty reason not to take one's children
mountaineering, for instance, but one's only duty is not to do so recklessly, or not
to do so negligently. What is prohibited by the prohibitory norm is not
conforming to the reason without (certain) justifications or excuses. In other cases
the "something else" is the commission of another, simpler wrong. One commits a
wrong by, say, spreading gossip, but a different and further wrong by spreading
gossip maliciously or dishonestly. What is prohibited by the prohibitory norm is
violation of another prohibitory norm for which one lacks (certain) justifications
or excuses.
In cases of both of these types-which frequently arise in the law as well as
in morality-one can agree that a certain argument is a defence while insisting
that it is also a denial of the offence. That is because it is a defence to a different
offence from the one that is denied. The offence that is denied is the one that is
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constituted by an indefensible or inadequately defended commission of the
offence that is not denied. This shows why it is natural to think (as I think, and I
like to think Fletcher thinks) that wrongs of the ordinary or basic type are "strict"
wrongs, wrongs of the type captured in "thou shalt not kill." Wrongs that are
committed only by those who are at fault are parasitic on such simple wrongs as
these. They are further wrongs that one commits by committing simpler "strict"
wrongs without (certain) justifications or excuses.
Those who think that wrongs committed with fault are the ordinary or basic
type, and that "strict" wrongs are special or odd, need to think again. They need
to learn from Rethinking Criminal Law. They need to grasp, in particular, the full
significance of the distinction between offence and defence. For that distinction,
technical and legalistic though it may sound, turns out to be the key to
understanding the relationship between wrongdoing and fault-not only in law,
but in morality as well.
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